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SUMMARY
Magnetically levitated (Maglev) vehicles operating on dedicated guideways at speeds of 500 km/hr are
an emerging transportation alternative to short-haul air and high-speed rail. They have the potential to offer
a service significantly more dependable than air and with less operating cost than both air and high-speed
rail. Maglev transportation derives these benefits by using magnetic forces to suspend a vehicle 8 to 200
mm above the guideway. Magnetic forces are also used for propulsion and guidance. The combination of
high speed, short headways, stringent ride quality requirements, and a distributed offboard propulsion
system necessitates high levels of automation for the Maglev control and operation. Very high levels of
safety and availability will be required for the Maglev control system. This paper describes the mission
scenario, functional requirements, and dependability and performance requirements of the Maglev
command, control and communications system. A distributed hierarchical architecture consisting of
vehicle on-board computers, wayside zone computers, a central computer facility, and communication links
between these entities was synthesized to meet the functional and dependability requirements of the maglev.
Two variations of the basic architecture are described: the Smart Vehicle Architecture (SVA) and the Zone
Control Architecture (ZCA). Preliminary dependability modeling results are also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Magnetically levitated (Maglev) vehicles operating on dedicated guideways at speeds of 500 km/hr are
an emerging transportation alternative to short-haul air and high-speed rail. They have the potential to offer
a service significantly more dependable than air and with less operating cost than both air and high-speed
rail. Maglev transportation derives these benefits by using magnetic forces to suspend a vehicle 8 to 200
mm above the guideway. Magnetic forces are also used for propulsion and guidance. A combination of
factors such as high speed, short headways, stringent ride quality requirements, and a distributed offboard
propulsion system make Maglev a unique mode of travel.
Maglev vehicles will travel at a much higher speed than conventional trains and at a significantly higher
speed than conventional high speed rail. Although the higher speed increases transportation productivity, it
implies more serious consequences if the control system fails to maintain safe train separation. Thus, the
response time of the control system must be on a par with the response times of aircraft control systems.
Furthermore, achieving a passenger load which makes the system economically viable, requires the shortest
* This work was sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration under Contract DTFR-53-91-C-00043.
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headwayspossiblewithin the limits of safetrainseparation.Thisconflict betweencapacityandsafetycan
bemitigatedby theuseof afully automatedandvalidatedcontrolsystemwhichofferssignificantlyfaster
responsetimesthanoneusinghumanoperators.
TheMaglevcontrolsystemwill becomprisedof sensors,actuators,communicationlinks,and
computerswhosecollectiveactivitieswill becoordinatedanddirectedby.controlanddecisionmaking
software.Maglevcontrolsystemsarerequiredto makemanydecisionsm real-time. Theconsequencesof
an incorrector latedecisioncouldbecatastrophic.Sincehumansafetyis atrisk, theautomatedcontrol
systemsmustworkcorrectlyandin atimelymannerunderall expectedoperatingconditions.Furthermore,
sincethefailureof onepartof thesystemcandisrupttravelalonganentireroute,thecontrolsystemfor
Maglevmustnotonly besafebutalsohighlyavailable.
Sincehardwareandsoftwareareexpectedto fail at sometimeduringthelife of thesystem,thesystem
mustbeableto toleratethesefaultswhilemaintainingnormaloperationsor, in theexceptional,worstcase
scenario,fail in asafemanner.Thatis, thesystemshouldcontinueto functioncorrectlyasawholeeven
whenpartshavefailed. This is referredto asfault-tolerantoperation.If this is notpossible,thesystem
mustbeableto systematicallyshutdownin asafemanner,i.e.,fail-safeoperation.
Underthesponsorshipof theUSDepartmentof Transportation,adesign-for-validationmethodology
previouslydevelopedby DraperLaboratory[1] hasbeenappliedto thedesignof thecontrolcomputer
systemfor ahypotheticalUSMaglevTransportationSystem[2]. Followingthekey stepsprescribedby
themethodology,themissionscenario,functionalrequirements,anddependabilityrequtrementsof the
Maglevcommand,controlandcommunicationsystemweredeveloped.Performancerequirementswere
thenquantifiedwith variationsallowingfor bothelectro-dynamic(EDS)andelectro-magnetic(EMS)
suspensions.
A distributedhierarchicalarchitectureconsistingof vehicleon-boardcomputers,waysidezone
computers,acentralcomputerfacility, andcommunicationlinks betweentheseentitieswassynthesizedto
meetthefunctionalanddependabilityrequirementsof theMaglev. Twovariationsof thebasicarchitecture
weredeveloped:in theSmartVehicleArchitecture(SVA)theon-boardcomputerhastheprimary
responsibilityfor traincontrolandthewaysidezonecomputersprovidebackupandconsistencychecking;
in ZoneControlArchitecture(ZCA) theserolesarereversed.
A setof qualitativeandquantitativeevaluationcriteriafor theMaglevcontrolcomputersystemwere
developed.A fail-safecommunicationprotocolfor theSVA wasproposedandusedto modelandanalyze
thedependabilitycharacteristicsof thisarchitecture.
II. MAGLEV MISSION SCENERIO
The f'trst step in the design-for-validation methodology is to develop a concept of operations which
defines the mission scenario, including the method of operation and the operational environment, and speci-
ties the computer control functional requirements. The concept of operations presented here is intended to
produce a control system which can meet the most rigorously demanding operational requirements of an
advanced and fully developed Maglev transportation system. Figure 1 shows various phases of operation
of a typical Maglev vehicle during a 24-hour period.
During a stationary pre-run inspection in the maintenance phase, the vehicle performs internal self-
checks on all its vital systems. Another use of the maintenance phase is to perform routine periodic
maintenance. At this time, the maintenance crew inspects the vehicle, reviews fault logs and conducts the
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schedulediagnostictestscalledfor by thevehiclelife-cyclemaintenanceprogram.Theintervalbetween
thesemaintenanceperiodscanbeadjustedto meettheavailabilityrequirementof thevehicle. When
necessary,thecrewreplacescomponents(LineReplaceableModulesor LineReplaceableUnits) identified
asfaulty. If thetestingandnormallyscheduledmaintenanceproceduresdo not identify anymajorrepairs,
thecrewadvancesthevehicleto thenormaloperationphase.Otherwise,thevehicleis takenoff-line and
movedto abayor acentralrepairfacility for moreextensivedepotmaintenance.
Duringnormaloperation,built-in-test(BIT) maintenanceoperationsareconductedin thebackground
andanydetectedfaultsareloggedin non-volatilemassmemory.Theaveragedurationof travelis two
hoursandtwentyminutes,includingstationstopsandpost-missionmaintenance,for atotalof twenty-two
hoursdaily. Thereis anaverageof threeoff-line stationstopspermission. Stationstopslastanaverage
of threeminutes,duringwhichtimepassengersboardandleavethetrain,andadditionalBIT maintenance
isperformed.Thevehiclehassufficientredundancyin all of its systemsto allow it to bedispatchedwith
faults,shouldthosefaultsoccurduringnormaloperation.Of course,thereis someminimumcomplement
of componentswhichmustbefunctioningto allow thesystemtomaintaintherequiredlevelof reliability
for agivenmission.This iscalledtheminimumdispatchcomplement(MDC). If faultsaccumulatesuch
thattheMDC isnot functioning,thevehicleis not allowedto continueoperationasthiswouldexposethe
passengersandcrewto anunacceptablerisk of injury. At thispoint thevehiclewouldoperatein a
degradedmode,soasto beableto arriveatthenextstationfor repairs. Redundancywhichexceedsthe
systemrequirementsfor safeoperationincreasestheavailabilityof thesystemby allowingdispatchin the
presenceof failedcomponents.Furthermore,additionalredundancyalsoenhancesthemaintainabilityof
thesystemby deferringrepairsuntil theyarenormallyscheduledto takeplacein a maintenancefacility.
Thecapacityof eachvehicleis 120passengers.Thelinespeedbetweenstationsis 500km/hour.
Vehicleswill bedispatchedsoasto allow avolumeof 4,000to 12,000passengersperhourto travelalong
theroute. At peakcapacity,theheadwayfor eachvehicleis approximately36secondsor 4 kilometersat
400krn/hour.
Off-line stationsoffer significantadvantagesin termsof capacityandflexible schedulesrequiredby
theinter-citytransportationmarketin theUS. An off-line stationisessentiallya sectionof guidewaybuilt
parallelto themainline. A specializedsectionof the guideway,calledtheswitch,allowsavehicleto be
divertedto eitherthemainlineor theoff-line sections.Navigationof theswitchmaybeaccomplishedin
two ways,referredto asactiveorpassiveswitching. In so-calledpassiveswitching,theguidewaysimply
formsaY-shapeandthevehiclenegotiatesaroutedownonefork or theother. In anactiveswitch,a
flexiblesectionof guidewayis movedfrom onepositionto theother,therebyalteringtheroutethevehicle
follows. In eithercase,switchingposesa significantburdenon thecontrolsystembothfor safetyand
performance.
Thefinal parameterswhichcanhaveasignificantimpacton th_architectureof theMaglevcontrol
computersystemaretheridequalityandpassengercomfortandthenumberanddistancebetweenwayside
zonecontrollersandsafestoppingareas.
Thelevelof ridecomfortfor normal,non-emergencyoperationswill meetthetwo hourreduced
comfortlimits stipulatedby ISO-2631.Foremergencysituations,adecelerationrangeis allowed,
dependingon theseverityof thesituation.Whenconditionsallow,adecelerationof notmorethan0.25g
will beused.Forextremesituations,for example,whennecessaryto decelerateto preventor mitigatea
suddenstop,decelerationsof up to 0.5g areallowed.
Betweenanytwo stationsthereareapproximatelyforty waysidezonecontrollers.Thedistance
betweenthesewaysidezonesis2 kilometers.Thesiteof eachwaysidezonecontrolleralsoservesasa safe
stoppingareabetweenstations.
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Figure 1. Maglev mission scenario vehicle state diagram.
III. MAGLEV FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
In order to determine the detailed computational requirements of the complete Maglev system, a set of
functional requirements must be specified. Computational requirements include throughput, memory,
processing lag, function iteration rate, order dependencies among functions, and I/0 and inter-function
communication rates. To fully specify the computer architecture for Maglev, constraints imposed on the
control computer must also be provided, such as limitations on weight, power and volume.
Guided ground transportation control systems must perform three principal functions: control,
protection, and supervision. In a fully automated system, these functions are performed by three main
control system components: the onboard control computer, the wayside or zone control computer, and the
central control computer. Each system component performs different aspects of each of the three principal
functions. Historically, the vehicle control function has been performed by each individual vain as it makes
its way along the track. Wayside control has performed most of the functions pertaining to route integrity,
such as operating the switching mechanisms and setting the maximum speed for a given section of track
[4]. This division of tasks, which has been demonstrated to provide a reliable means of safe vain
separation, follows naturally from the fact the propulsion system which controls the velocity, acceleration,
and braking of the vehicle is physically resident onboard the vehicle and the wayside has up-to-date
knowledge of the track in its locale. However, the propulsion system for Maglev vehicles is not resident
onboard the vehicle, but rather housed in stations distributed along the guideway. The design of the Maglev
control system must reflect this important difference. The role of the central control computer is to perform
the high level planning and coordination functions, such as setting up train arrival and departure schedules
as well as scheduling maintenance operations. Central control also plays a role in coordinating the response
of the system to an emergency situauon. Some aspects of central control may actually be performed by
computers located in stations.
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Each of the three principal functions which must be performed by the Maglev control system, i.e.
control, protection, and supervision, can be decomposed into several well-defined sub-functions. This
purely functional analysis of the control system may be used as the basis for the design of a control
architecture. By partitioning the sub-functions among the various control elements which make up the
system, an optimal design for safety and reliability can be achieved. The functional decomposition of the
Maglev control system is presented in Table 1. A quantitative analysis of the computational requirements of
each function was performed and these results are summarized below.
Vehicle Control Functions
The vehicle state function is a sensing function which monitors the vehicle position, travel direction,
speed, and acceleration. The velocity control function causes the speed and direction of travel of each
vehicle to match the speed mandated by its travel profile (determined by the route planning and scheduling
functions) in accordance with the existing conditions on the guideway. The velocity control must
coordinate the activities of the individual propulsion power units in the guideway, which are nominally
spaced at 2 km intervals along the guideway. Closer spacing of power units provides finer granularity of
control for additional cost.
The levitation control for the EMS design consists of controlling the gap (about 8 ram) between the
levitation magnets and the guideway at about 100 Hz. This is accomplished by controlling the current flow
in the onboard electromagnets, which in turn determines the attractive magnetic force between the vehicle
electromagnets and the guideway ferromagnets. For the EDS design, the gap does not require active
control. However, the temperature of the superconducting onboard electromagnets needs to be carefully
monitored and maintained at about 5 ° K. If the temperature rises above this value, quenching will occur
leading to a loss of magnetic force.
Table 1. Maglev Control System Functions
CONTROL
Vehicle State
Velocity Control
Levitation Control
Lateral Position Control
Propulsion Control
Secondary Suspension Control
Route Control
Vehicle Systems Monitoring
Vehicle Systems Control
Environmental Monitoring
PROTECTION
Safe Vehicle Separation
Vehicle Position Control
Route Integrity
Emergency Stopping
Emergency Speed Control
Emergency Position Control
Emergency Response
Failure Management
SUPERVISION
Route Planning
Route Scheduling
Dispatching
Maintenance Scheduling
Operator Interface
Status Displays
Passenger Supervision
For lateral position control (EMS design) the gap between the lateral guidance electromagnets and the
guideway must be actively controlled in the same manner as for the levitation magnets. For the EDS design,
the temperature of the superconducting guidance magnets must be maintained in the same manner as that of
the temperature control of the levitation magnets.
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Propulsion is achieved by the use of a linear synchronous motor made up of conducting windings,
installed along the length of the guideway, and variable frequency converters which, together with the
necessary switch gear, are located at sites distributed along the guideway. Each power unit can control the
motion of a vehicle along a section of guideway called a zone. The speed of the vehicle within a zone is
controlled by varying the frequency of a traveling electromagnetic field produced in the stator windings of
the guideway by the power electronics system.
The purpose of the secondary suspension system is to provide a satisfactory level of ride comfort to
passengers in the vehicle. EDS systems which possess a fairly stiff primary suspension require an actively
controlled secondary suspension to achieve a satisfactory level of ride quality. For EMS systems, active
control may not be necessary but could be provided to enhance the overall smoothness of the ride and offset
jerk due to sudden accelerations and lateral motions induced by turns and cross-winds. The secondary
suspension can be provided by a combination of actively controlled aerodynamic surfaces and actively or
passively controlled dampers.
The route control function guides the vehicle through one of two possible paths at switching points in
the guideway as indicated in the route profile. If an active switch is employed, the switching mechanism
must be engaged at precisely the right moment to allow adequate time to detect a possible mechanical failure
and safely stop an approaching vehicle. Designs of passive switches vary greatly but all require control of
either an electrical or mechanical subsystem with similar timing and verification requirements to those of an
active switch.
Onboard systems such as lighting, temperature, air flow, secondary braking capability, charge level of
onboard batteries, and door position control are monitored and adjusted periodically. Environmental
conditions such as the electromagnetic field strength at various positions in the coach, lateral wind speed
and direction and external temperature are measured periodically. Advance weather information is
collected.
Vehicle Protection Functions
These functions provide a fail-safe mode of operation. They can override the actions of the vehicle
control functions and take control of a vehicle which has exceeded some safety threshold.
The safe separation function is responsible for ensuring that a minimum spacing of 4 km or 2 zones is
maintained between any two consecutive vehicles on the guideway. The route integrity function monitors
the integrity of the guideway and the propulsion and levitation coils. The guideway.must remain properly
aligned and free from hazards such as ice, litter, animals, etc. The emergency stopping function is
employed when the primary braking capability of the linear synchronous motor provided by the guideway
has failed. Secondary braking is accomplished by a combination of aerodynamic braking from either the
trailing flap or a parachute, eddy currents, and friction after the vehicle has contacted the guideway.
The emergency speed control function is employed when the propulsive force provided by the
guideway has failed. Sufficient energy must be available from batteries and the linear generators (which
operate only while the train is moving) to control levitation, braking, and other loads. The vehicle is only
allowed to stop at areas deemed safe stopping areas. A safe stopping area provides a means of safe
evacuation of passengers from the vehicle. The emergency position control function determines the exact
stopping point for a vehicle in an emergency stopping situation. Information about safe stopping points is
maintained for each zone along the guideway.
182
Vehicle Supervision Functions
Supervision functions include route planning, scheduling and dispatching vehicles on these routes,
displays of vehicle status, position, and velocity, weather displays, etc. A detailed discussion of these
functions can be found in [2].
Computational Performance Requirements
A quantitative analysis of each of the computer control functions was performed to determine the
computer performance required to do all of the Maglev functions. Estimates were made of such parameters
as the iteration rate, throughput, memory, sensor data, frequency of reading sensors and outputting
actuators, etc. for each function. These estimates were aggregated to help size the computer and
communication links. A detailed discussion of the performance requirements is outside the scope of this
paper due to space limitations but can be found in [2]. However, in summary, we can state that 10 to 15
MIPS throughput, 20 to 25 Mbytes of on-line memory, about 5 to 10 Mbits/sec of I/O bandwidth, and a
100 Hz iteration rate for the highest frequency control tasks would be sufficient to not only perform the
functions identified here but also allow for about 50% growth margin. These requirements are well within
the state-of-the-art of current microprocessors. If performance requirements were the only driver, the
design of the Maglev control computer system would be a fairly straightforward task. However, it is the
dependability dimension as well as validation of the system which makes the design a challenging task.
These requirements are discussed next.
IV. MAGLEV DEPENDABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Dependability is defined as the trustworthiness of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably
be placed on the service it delivers [5]. Reliability, availability, and safety are some of the attributes used to
quantify the dependability of a system.
The reliability requirement, stated as a probability of failure, for the system control software, and
presumably for the hardware upon which it executes, for commercial Maglev transportation, as specified in
the draft Maglev System Parameters [3], is 10-9. This requirement is based on the commercial transport
flight control requirements mandated by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Those
requirements pertainto a 10-hr commercial passenger flight.
It should be noted that for aircraft, the terms reliability and safety are used interchangeably as far as the
flight-critical controls are concerned. This is due to the fact that the failure of a flight-critical computer is
always assumed to result in a catastrophic aircraft failure if there is no backup system. In other words, for
flight control computers, there is no fail-safe state. Hence, the reliability of the system, i.e. the probability
that it will operate correctly over a given time interval, is equal to the safety of the system, which is the
probability that it will operate correctly or fail in a safe manner. This is not necessarily the case for Maglev.
If the control computer on-board the vehicle were to fail, it may not always lead to a catastrophic vehicle
failure. For example, the computer may fail-stop and the vehicle may coast to a stop on the guideway. Or,
the computer may cause the vehicle to exceed the speed limit which may be detected by a wayside computer
which, in turn, may not turn the power on to the next section of the guideway resulting in the safe stopping
of the vehicle. Thus, there are several alternatives available to bring a Maglev vehicle to a safe stop in the
absence of a functioning on-board computer which are not available to an aircraft in flight. For these
reasons, the safety and the reliability requirements for Maglev must be distinguished. In particular, the
reliability requirement stated above for a commercial transport aircraft becomes the safety requirement for
Maglev vehicles, which then may be specified as follows:
183
"The maximum acceptable probability of failure of the (safety-critical) computers is 10"10per vehicle per
hour of operation."
This requirement applies to the total computer system, including the hardware and software of the
onboard vehicle, wayside and central control facility computers. The reliability requirement for Maglev
relates to the probability of successfully completing a trip and a reasonable value for not completing a trip
due to computer system malfunction is 10 -6 per vehicle per hour.
The overall reliability and safety requirements for Maglev may be illustrated as follows. If 1 billion
trips, each of 1 hour duration, were undertaken by a fleet of Maglev vehicles, then all except 1000 trips
should be completed successfully. Of the 1000 trips in which the vehicles did not arrive at their destination
without incident, only 1 would result in a catastrophic accident. If we assume that Maglev trains have the
same number of scheduled departures per day as airplanes in the US, i.e. 14,000 .per day., andthat each trip
averages one hour, these 1 billion trips will take approximately 195 years. Over Mat penoo ot ume, m a
system which met the stated reliability and safety requirement, there would only be five incomplete trips per
year and a total of one catastrophic accident attributable to the failure of the control computer system.
The availability of the Maglev transportation system is going to play a very important part in the
public's acceptance of this mode of transportation. For the domestic US commercial airlines, the
availability of the airliners approaches or exceeds 99 per cent. Less than 1 per cent of the flights are
delayed or cancelled due to mechanical, electrical, hydraulic or other aircraft system related failures. It is
obvious that the Maglev transportation system will have to match or exceed this level of dependability in
order to be accepted by the public. A reasonable availability requirement for Maglev may be specified as
follows:
"The maximum acceptable probability of not being dispatch ready for a trip for each Maglev vehicle
will be 10-2. ''
This requirement applies to all the subsystems on-board each vehicle. The unavailability(
apportionment for the control computer subsystem is assumed to be one tenth of this, or 10 -_ per vehicle
per trip. That is, only one tenth of the unavailable vehicles will be stuck due to on-board control computer
system failures.
V. MAGLEV CONTROL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Section III presented the principal functions to be performed by the Maglev computer control system:
control, protection, and supervision. These functions can now be mapped to specific computation sites
within the overall control computer architecture.
The overall Maglev control architecture is distributed and hierarchical. Its principal subsystems are an
onboard vehicle computer system for each vehicle, a wayside zone computer system for each zone, and a
central facility computer system as shown in Figure 2. Two basic architectures, which represent extremes
of a continuum, are presented here.
In the Zone Control Architecture (ZCA), the primary responsibility for vehicle control rests with the
wayside zone control computers, with the onboard system providing backup and consistency checking.
Vehicle protection is distributed among the three subsystems. In the Smart Vehicle Architecture (SVA), the
onboard computer has the primary responsibility for vehicle control, with the wayside zone computers
providing backup and consistency checking. The functions relating to vehicle protection are again
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distributed among the three subsystems. The function-subsystem mapping for these architectures is
shown in Table 2. In this table, P signifies the primary assignment, B signifies the backup assignment
used for verification and consistency checking, and I represents local access to information in a database.
In both architectures, the vehicle protection subsystem operates independently from the vehicle control
functions, and therefore provides a fail-safe mode of operation. In cases where the speed or position of a
vehicle exceeds safety thresholds, these protection functions can override the actions of the control functions
and assume control of the vehicle. The supervision function is performed by the central facility computer
system, which also includes major computing subsystems located in stations. However, the supervisory
data such as the travel or route profile for a given vehicle which is needed by the primary control computer
to adequately perform its function is transferred to that computer on at least a daily basis and may be
updated more frequently. This form of operation views all normal train travel as planned in advance and all
passengers riding in reserved seats. However, either architecture could be adapted to a demand driven
schedule which requires more real-time planning capability.
In general, those functions which can best be performed in one site over another are assigned to those
sites. For example, the control of levitation, guidance, secondary suspension, and onboard systems like
air conditioning and lighting all require the control of onboard actuators. Furthermore, the sensors needed
to obtain feedback information for these systems are also onboard. Hence, the control of these functions
should be performed by an onboard computer. Other criteria used to assign functions to particular
computational sites include minimization of communication and data latency, minimization of adverse
effects of failures of communication links and processors, and ability to validate the architecture. Functions
which can be performed by an onboard computer with a minimum of communication overhead is that of
emergency stopping, emergency speed control, and emergency position control. The emergency which
these functions are intended to address is the failure of the guideway propulsion and primary braking
capability. The power for these emergency operations comes from batteries carded onboard for that
purpose. The vehicle must be able to reduce its speed, continue onto a safe stopping area and stop there so
that passengers can disembark safely from the vehicle and the elevated guideway.
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Figure 2. Maglev control computer architecture.
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Table 2. Function Assignment for the Zone Control Architecture and the Smart Vehicle Architecture
CONTROL
Vehicle Locat_ion
Velocity Control
Levitation Control
Lateral Position Control
Propulsion Control
Secondar F Suspension Control
Route Control
Vehicle Systems Monitoring
Vehicle Systems Control
Environmental Monitoring
PROTECTION
Safe Vehicle Separation
Vehicle Position
Route Integrity
Emergency Stopping
Emergency Speed Control
Emergency Position Control
Emergency Response
Failure Management
SUPERVISION
Route Planning
Route Scheduling
Dispatching
Maintenance Scheduling
Operator Interface
Status Displays
Passenger Supervision
ZONE CONTROL ARCHITECTURE SMART VEHICLE ARCHITECTURE
Onboard Wayside I Central IIOnboard Wayside Central
B
B
P
P
P
B
P
P
B
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
B
P
B
B
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B
P
P
P
P
B
B
P
P
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P B
B
P
P
P
P
P
P
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P
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P
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The rationale behind the ZCA is that, unlike conventional transportation systems in which the
mechanism for vehicle propulsion is resident onboard, the Maglev system is powered from the guideway.
The propulsion control must be co-located with the power converters, i.e. within the same zone control
computers, since the required iteration rate is so high as to preclude any communication latency. Since the
wayside zone controllers must communicate with each other to coordinate the speed of the vehicle as it
passes from one zone to the next, they can also perform the function of safe vehicle separation and vehicle
position which are related to vehicle speed. The communication between wayside systems can be carried
out through very reliable media such as redundant fiber optic links. By locating sensors in the guideway,
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the vehicle location and route integrity functions can also be performed by the wayside using sensors
embedded in or alongside the guideway for these purposes. Route control, or the direction of the vehicle
through a switch, can also be performed from a wayside computer, especially if the switching mechanism
is that of a moveable section of guideway. The ZCA most closely resembles conventional railway control
systems without the attendant communication overhead that characterizes systems controlling onboard
propulsion from the wayside [4].
The rationale behind the SVA is that an autonomous vehicle can most easily direct its own motion since
it is in a position to obtain information about its own state and the state of its surroundings. It must be able
to perform these functions for emergency purposes anyway. Hence, it may as well perform them for
normal operations. It can easily communicate speed commands to wayside propulsion control systems
using radio communication. Information about its speed, position, and acceleration are also easily obtained
from a combination of a Global Positioning Satellite System and low cost Inertial Navigation Systems such
as those based on micro-mechanical instruments, the technology for which will be available by the time the
U.S. Maglev Transportation System reaches the prototype development stage. With information about its
position and speed, it can perform the functions of safe vehicle separation and vehicle position control by
communicating with vehicles both ahead of it and behind it on the guideway. By using onboard sensors, it
can also perform route integrity checks both for alignment and obstacle detection. Furthermore, it can
easily direct its movement through switches, i.e. perform route control operations, especially if the
switches in use do not involve moveable sections of guideway but rather some vehicle-borne steering
mechanism. The SVA most closely resembles the most advanced control systems being installed on
conventional and high speed rail systems [4].
In order to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of each architecture, a quantitative analysis
must be performed. The dependability analysis of the onboard control computer for the SVA architecture is
presented in the next section. The remaining analyses, namely the dependability analysis of the other
components in the SVA and the ZCA and the performance analyses of both architectures, are planned for
the next phase of this study. Additionally, life cycle cost also should be used as an evaluation criterion.
Components contributing to life cycle cost include not only the initial acquisition cost of hardware and
software but also the cost of validating and certifying the hardware and software for safety and the cost of
maintaining the system over its life time.
VI. PRELIMINARY DESIGN SPECIFICATION OF THE SVA ONBOARD CONTROL
COMPUTER
For the US Maglev Transportation System Onboard Control Computer (OCC), a baseline system
using a Fault Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) has been selected. The architecture of the Fault Tolerant
Parallel Processor (FTPP) developed by Draper Laboratory was conceived to serve applications with
requirements for ultra-high dependability and real-time performance. The FTPP architecture is described in
references [6] and [7]. It is composed of many Processing Elements (PEs) and a few specially designed
hardware components referred to as Network Elements (NEs). The multiple Processing Elements provide
a parallel processing environment as well as components for hardware redundancy. The group of Network
Elements acts as the intercomputer communications network and the redundancy management hardware.
The FTPP architecture has been designed to accommodate up to 5 NEs and 40 PEs in a single cluster. PEs
can be configured in triply or quadruply redundant virtual groups or virtual processors. Since a single
state-of-the-art microprocessor provides adequate throughput for the present application, the FTPP is not
used as a parallel processor here.
For the baseline OCC an FTPP with one triplex Virtual Processor (VP) and one simplex spare has
been selected. The selection of this minimal system is based on the minimum redundancy level needed to
mask hardware faults in real-time without suspending time-critical application tasks. If the baseline system
falls short of the Maglev RMAS requirements presented in Section IV, additional processing elements
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(PEs)and/orNetworkElements(NEs)will beaddedasnecessary.Forthepurposeof thepresentanalysis,
theprocessingelementswill beMotorola68040swhicharedirectlycompatiblewith theVMEbus-based
networkelements.This baselinesystemwill bemodeledfor safety,reliability andavailabilityin Section
VII.
A brief reviewof the definitions of safety, reliability, availability, and related terms for the onboard
computer is presented in Appendix I since they are particularly important to the following discussion and
analysis.
OCC Functionality and Dependability Requirements
The functions performed by the onboard control computer were listed in Table 2. Although velocity
and position of the vehicle are directly controlled by the wayside zone control computers (ZCCs), the
vehicle itself monitors its precise position and velocity and determines its own speed profile based on
existing conditions onboard, in its present zone, and in the system as a whole. The requested velocity is
sent as a command via a radio communication link to the wayside zone control computer for the zone in
which it is traveling. The iteration rates, throughput, memory, and I/O bandwidth requirements of the OCC
ensemble of functions are well within the capabilities of the 68040-based processor board such as the
MVME-167 with adequate margins allowed to perform operations for fault tolerance and redundancy
management.
Since most of the functions performed by the onboard computer are safety-critical, the inability to
perform these functions reliably constitutes an unsafe condition and requires that the vehicle be brought to a
stop. However, the vehicle has no onboard mechanism which it can apply directly to stop itself in an
emergency. Thus, it must communicate the command to stop to the wayside zone control computer (or the
central control computer if the ZCC has failed), which can control the braking mechanism that can bring the
vehicle to a stop. Every unsafe condition must be detected and cause a stop command to be issued.
However, due to the redundant nature of the system, every fault does not create an unsafe condition. For
example, as long as at least two channels of the OCC are operating correctly, safe operation of the onboard
control computer is assured. Thus, if one of the three channels of a triplex OCC were to fail, the remaining
two channels can continue to operate the vehicle safely.
A failure mode which poses a special problem for reliability (as distinct from safety) is the potential
ability of a failed channel to generate an unnecessary stop command, a so-called false alarm. If safety were
the only consideration, false alarms would not present a problem. However, false alarms drive down the
reliability of the system by increasing the number of unsuccessful missions. In addition, false alarms also
reduce the availability of the system as a whole. A disabled vehicle on the guideway renders the guideway
unavailable to other traffic until it is removed. Such an event reduces the availability of the guideway.
What is needed is the guaranteed ability to stop safely when continued operation would be unsafe, as
well as the ability to prevent false alarms from triggering unnecessary stops. The design discussed below
operates in just that way.
OCC Architecture
Figure 3 shows a block representation of the FrPP-based onboard control computer. Three
processing elements, designated TA, TB and TC in the figure, form the fault tolerant virtual processor (VP)
which conducts the onboard control functions. The fourth PE, designated S 1, acts as a spare. For
simplicity, the four Network Elements (NEs) are not shown in the figure. Each Processing Element (PE) is
connected to an I/O bus through a specialized interface called the monitor interlock. The redundant I/O
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busses are identical. The sensors and actuators needed to perform all of the onboard control functions are
attached to these busses, including the radio transmitter used to send velocity/stop commands to the
wayside zone controller. Only one channel actually transmits a message to the zone controller. The VP
decides which channel this will be.
The purpose of the monitor interlock is to prevent a channel or transmitter which has failed in an active
manner from flooding the system with false messages, i.e. the monitor interlock transforms active faults
into passive ones. It operates by turning off the power to the failed channel or to its I/O bus.
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Figure 3. Block diagram of FTPP-based OCC architecture.
Spare PEs or NEs can be used in the OCC to increase availability. Activating a spare is a form of
automated repair called reconfiguration. Although the time required to effect this type of automatic
maintenance is only on the order of one second, it is still a relatively long period of time to suspend the vehicle
control application which typically must execute every 10 milliseconds. Hence, for this analysis, it is
assumed that reconfigurations of this type only occur when a vehicle is stopped at either a station or on the
guideway following an emergency stop. If modelling shows the reliability of the triplex system is
inadequate, the baseline system will be upgraded to a quadruplex FFPP (4 PEs) with 5 NEs and one spare
PE.
OCC-Zone Controller Communication Protocol
The communication protocol followed by the onboard and wayside zone computers is designed to
prevent false alarms while guaranteeing that every real alarm condition in the OCC results in the
transmission of a stop command. It operates as follows. Periodically, the vehicle transmits a well-formed
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message (WFM) to the wayside zone controller. The specification of a well-formed message is presented
below. The maximum allowable time period between a vehicle's transmission of two consecutive well-
formed messages is denoted xl in Figure 4. If the zone controller receives a well-formed message from the
vehicle, it replies with an acknowledgement within a bounded period of time. The maximum allowable
time between a zone controller's reception of a WFM and the OCC's reception of the acknowledgement is
denoted by x0 in the figure. Since the time between the transmission of a message by the OCC and its
reception by the ZCC is very small relative to the values of xl and x0, these events can be considered as
occurring simultaneously.
These time-out periods are important because the absence of either an expected message or an
acknowledgement by either side within the time-out period results in a corrective action. When the
corrective actions do not produce the required response, a potentially unsafe condition exists and results in
an emergency stop. Thus, if the ZCC does not receive a WFM within a small multiple of Xl, it assumes
that the OCC is in an unsafe condition and so performs an emergency stop. Similarly, if the OCC does not
receive an acknowledgement from the ZCC within "cOafter transmitting a WFM, it assumes that the
outgoing message has been corrupted and performs some recuperative action' such as switching to another
transmitter and retransmitting the message.
The format of a well-formed message transmitted from an OCC to a ZCC is shown in Figure 5. The
message consists of a data field and an authentication field. The data field carries the velocity command and
other information which the zone controller uses to propel the vehicle at the indicated speed as well as some
information specific to the fail-safe communication protocol. The authentication field consists of N 64-bit
subfields whose value is uniquely determined as a function of the current message and the channel of the
FTPP which generated the value. Each subfield is called the signature of its channel. Each channel of the
FTPP is able to generate a unique, unforgeable signature for use by the wayside zone controller in
authenticating a message, and, for a given message, no channel can generate the signature of another
channel. Prior to transmitting the WFM to the ZCC, each non-faulty channel of the OCC signs the
outgoing message and delivers it to the designated transmitter over the OCC's interchannel communication
links. Since N is the redundancy level of the onboard VP, 3 <-N _<5. Thus for the baseline system N = 3.
Details regarding the subfields in a WFM and their use in the protocol can be found in [2].
OCC-Zone Controller Communication Protocol Operation
One further aspect of the protocol involves the number of onboard radio transmitters and receivers
which participate in message passing. While each I/O bus contains a radio transmitter, at any given time
only one onboard transmitter is used to send a message. Hence, the wayside zone controller only needs to
process a single message. To provide the designated transmitter channel with the capability to append the
appropriate authentication fields to the message to be transmitted to the ZCC, each channel independently
calculates its signature and provides it to the designated transmitter over the OCC's inter-channel
communication links. However, the radio receivers in all onboard channels listen for the
acknowledgement. If an acknowledgement is not received by a majority of the channels' receivers within a
specified timeout period after transmission of a WFM, the message is retransmitted from another
transmitter. Other fail-safe mechanisms are in place to deal with failures of the ZCC. These include the
ability of neighboring ZCCs to act as backups for each other as well as the ability of the central control
computer to bring any vehicle to a stop anywhere along the guideway. The details of these mechanisms are
beyond the scope of this analysis but must be specified before the fail-safe design of the system can be
considered complete. Similarly, if the zone controller does not receive a WFM from the onboard system
within a specified timeout period (such as some multiple of'q seconds), it initiates an emergency stop
procedure.
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Figure 5. Format of a well-formed message for the fail-safe communication protocol.
To see how this works consider the following scenarios. Suppose that the onboard computer
considers that channels A, B and C are working, and that the transmitter connected to channel C is
designated to transmit radio messages to the ZCC. Thus, the message contains an authentication mode of
ABC. Now suppose that C fails and transmits a stop command. The wayside zone controller would detect
this as a false alarm since at most one authentication field (C's) would be valid. (Recall that C cannot forge
the signatures of other channels.) This message will not be acknowledged by the ZCC within the timeout
x0, causing the onboard computer to retransmit a message from another channel, channel B for example,
which is not failed and which therefore does not contain a false emergency stop command. Note that this
message contains valid digital signatures from channels A and B, thus meeting the requirements for a WFM
emanating from a triplex OCC. Thus, the failure of one channel does not trigger an emergency stop. As
long as two channels continue to operate, messages are authenticated with the valid signatures of the two
working channels.
Furthermore, the OCC's local fault diagnosis function can now update the authentication mode in the
first WFM which is sent after the failure is detected to indicate that the OCC is now operating in a duplex
mode. Thus the authentication mode field now contains the value AB. Next suppose that channel B, the
designated transmitter in this scenario, fails. Either B attempts to transmit messages that are not well-
formed or ceases transmission altogether. In either event the ZCC will shut down the vehicle after
expiration of the timeout. Alternatively, A can detect B's failure and send an emergency stop message.
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Since this message has only one authentic signature, that of channel A, the vehicle is brought to a stop by
the ZCC as required by the communication protocol. If, for some reason, A's message does not get
through, the ZCC will not get a WFM, the timeout period will expire, and the vehicle will also be brought
to a safe stop. Finally, if B fails such that it sends a "false-alarm" emergency stop message which has
only one valid authentication signature and hence is not a WFM, the vehicle is again safely brought to a
stop by the ZCC. Stopping at this point is a correct action since, by definition, B has failed leaving only a
working simplex, namely channel A, in the system.
VII. SVA ONBOARD CONTROL COMPUTER DEPENDABILITY ANALYSIS
The primary objective of the dependability analysis is to produce a first order estimate of the safety,
reliability, and availability of the baseline SVA Onboard Control Computer. Additionally, it is desirable to
specify a system which is cost-effective by not allocating more redundancy than needed to meet the RMAS
requirements, i.e. to determine the Minimum Dispatch Complement (MDC) and to determine the spare
components needed to meet the availability requirement with a reasonable maintenance schedule.
The mission state diagram for the Maglev vehicle, shown in Figure 1, was used to construct a detailed
Markov model for reliability and safety. Of special interest are the fail-safe and fail-unsafe states. There
are only two events which can chive the system to a fail-unsafe state: coincident hardware faults and
common mode failures. The probability of the former is addressed below. The probability of the latter
cannot be stated with certainty; however, it can be reduced by various avoidance, removal and tolerances
techniques. A system failure which results in a fail-safe state does not necessarily require push-recovery to
rescue the vehicle. If the failure occurs as a result of a transient fault, which is by far the dominant failure
mode, the system may be restarted and the mission completed, albeit not on schedule. It has been noted
that the public can accept outage times of short duration (a few minutes), but outages longer than an hour
have a very negative impact. Hence this ability to recover from transient faults is very important to public
acceptance of Maglev.
The details of the Markov models, the underlying assumptions about component failure rates, fault
detection and recovery rates, etc. as well as the dependability evaluations of all the configurations analyzed
are beyond the scope of this paper. These details can be found in reference [2]. Only a summary of the
results of the dependability modeling effort is presented here.
Reliability and Safety
The reliability and safety of the baseline triplex OCC as well as a quadruplex version, for a single
mission, were evaluated with and without transient fault recovery. The advantage of not recovering from
transient faults is that exposure to coincident faults during the transient recovery period is avoided. The
disadvantage is that unreliability due to exhaustion of redundancy is not minimized. In the second policy,
the OCC attempts recovery from transient faults, which reduces the unreliability due to exhaustion of
redundancy but increases the exposure to coincident faults during the recovery period.
Two kinds of safe shutdowns are possible under a no-transient-recovery redundancy management
policy: "soft" shutdown and "hard" shutdown. If a fault is transient, the vehicle is stopped, the OCC re-
initializes itself and resumes operation as a fault tolerant controller, and the vehicle is restarted. This is a
soft shutdown. Thus this state does not contribute to vehicle unreliability, although it will contribute to a
late arrival at the destination station. In the hard shutdown states, the OCC has shut down due to
permanent faults and cannot re-initialize itself and resume operation as a fault tolerant controller, so this
state does contribute to vehicle unreliability. External activity such as a tow or physical replacement of an
OCC component is required before the vehicle can be cleared from the guideway. Finally, in the "unsafe
failure" category, the OCC is unable to safely control or shut down the vehicle.
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The Markov models were evaluated for mission times ranging from 1 to 5 hours using the values for
the failure and reconfiguration rates shown in Table 3. The results, for a mission time of 2.5 hours, are
presented in Table 4.
Table 3. Failure and Reconfiguration Rates
Rate
Permanent Failure Rate, _.p
Transient Failure Rate, _.t
Reconfiguration Rate From Permanent Faults, lap
Reconfiguration Rate From Transient Faults, I.tt
Value
1 x 10 -4 per hour (10,000 hours MTBF)
1 x 10 -3 per hour (1,000 hours MTBF)
5.5 x 106 per hour (20 msec)
2.8 x 104 per hour (1 sec)
Table 4.
Configuration
Reliability and Safety of Triplex & Quadruplex OCC
Probability of Soft Probability of Hard Probability of
Shutdown Shutdown Unsafe Failure
No Transient Recovery
Triplex 1.2 x 10 -5
Quadruplex 4.2 x 10 -8
With Transient Recovery
Triplex 0
i
Quadruplex 0
2.5x10-6 2.6x10-12
9.9x10-10 5.3x10-12
1.3x10-6 4.7x10-10
3.5x10-10 9.4x10-10
When the triplex OCC is operated without transient fault recovery, the dominant failure mode is soft
shutdown. Since soft shutdowns are caused by transient fault accumulation, the OCC can re-initialize from
the transient faults after shutting down the vehicle, and subsequently restart and safely control the vehicle.
Hard shutdowns are less likely than soft shutdowns, and are caused by permanent fault accumulation.
Finally, the probability of unsafe failure is much less likely than either of the two safe shutdown modes. In
this case, unsafe failure is primarily caused by a second fault occurring while the OCC is in the process of
diagnosing and reconfiguring from a previous fault.
When the triplex OCC is operated with transient fault recovery, the soft shutdown failure mode is
nonexistent. The probability of unsafe failure is higher by several orders of magnitude due to increased
exposure to a second coincident fault during the transient recovery period.
The probability of unsafe shutdown for a quadruplex OCC is slightly higher than that of the triplex
OCC because the quad's added hardware increases the overall failure rate and, consequently, the
probability of coincident faults. However, the probability of both hard and soft shutdowns is significantly
reduced due to the increased redundancy of the quadruplex.
As the above analysis shows, both the triplex and quadruplex OCC configurations exceed the safety
requirement of 10 -9 per hour. However, because the transient-recovery redundancy management options
for both configurations result in unsafe failure probabilities which are uncomfortably close to the OCC's
safety requirement, the no-transient-recovery option is preferable for safety reasons.
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Thetriplex OCCwithouttransientrecoverymarginallymeetstheOCC'sreliability specification(i.e.,
probabilityof hardor softshutdown)of 10-6perhour,while theadditionalredundancyof aquadruplex
OCCenablesit to exceedthisrequirementwith awidemargin. BecausethetriplexOCConly marginally
meetsthereliability requirement,thisanalysisleadsto theselectionof aquadruplexOCCoperatedwithout
transientfault recoveryasthebaselineOCCconfiguration.
Availability
TheOCCavailabilitydependson thenumberof FaultContainmentRegions(FCRs)in theOCC,the
MDC, andthescheduledmaintenanceinterval. ThepreviousanalysisindicatesthattheMDC mustconsist
of fourFCRsin ordertomeetthereliabilityandsafetyrequirements. Availability of twoOCC
configurationswasmodeled:onewith only theMDC, i.e., 4 FCRs,andanotherwith a spareFCR,i.e., a
totalof 5FCRs.Thescheduledmaintenanceintervalisa freevariablewhichcanbedeterminedbasedon the
OCC'smaximumallowableunavailability.Theavailabilitymodelingresultsarepresentedin Table5 for a
maintenanceintervalof 200hours(approximately8 days).
Table5. AvailabilityAnalysisof OCC
Configuration MDC
5 FCRs 4
4 FCRs 4
Unavailabilityafter200hours
3.7x 10-3
7.5x10 -2
Theavailabilityanalysisindicatesthat 1spareFCRyieldsanunavailabilityafter200wall-clockhours
of 3.7x 10-3,which slightlyexceedstheOCCmaximumunavailabilityrequirementof 10-3.
Furtherdetailedanalysisis necessaryto performsometradeoffs.Forexample,themaintenanceinterval
canbedecreasedwhilemaintaininganominalconfigurationof 5 FCRs.Thelife-cyclecostsof more
frequentperiodicmaintenancemustbecomparedto thesavingsaccrueddueto lowerFCRhardware
procurementcosts.OranadditionalFCRcanbeaddedto increasethenominalconfigurationto sixFCRs.
This wouldallow themaintenanceintervalto bestretchedto 400hours.Theacquisitioncostof the
additionalFCRhardwaremustbecomparedto thesavingsaccruedby deferringperiodicmaintenancein a
life cyclecostanalysisto determinethecost-effectivenessof thisstrategy.Also, thefailurerateof theOCC
componentscanbedecreasedin a numberof ways,suchasreducingtheircomplexity(whilestill meeting
therequiredOCCfunctionality),exploitingadvancedpackaging(whichmayincreasetheOCC'scost),
utilizing higher-qualitycomponents(whichmayalsoincreasetheOCC'scost),or housingthecomponents
in amorebenignenvironmentinorderto reducetheirfailurerates.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Magnetically levitated vehicles operating on dedicated guideways at speeds of up to 500 KM/HR are
now being designed in the US, Europe and Japan. The operation and control of these vehicles will be
totally automated. This paper has defined the functions that must be performed by the automated control
computer system. Safety, reliability, and availability requirements for the control computer system were
also defined. A distributed hierarchical architecture consisting of vehicle on-board computers, wayside zone
computers, and a central computer facility was defined to meet the functional and dependability
requirements of Maglev. Two variations of the basic architecture, the Zone Control Architecture and the
Smart Vehicle Architecture, and their qualitative attributes were also discussed. An architecture for the
control computer onboard the Maglev vehicle (OCC) for the SVA was presented along with a
communication protocol which provides a fail-safe mode of operation without reducing mission reliability
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or overallsystemavailability. DetailedMarkovreliabilityandavailabilitymodelsof theOCCin theSVA
wereconstructedandusedto analyzethesafety,reliability, andavailabilityof theOCC. Basedon this
analysis,a baselineconfigurationof theOCCwasselectedwhichmeetsits dependabilityandperformance
requu'ementsin acosteffectiveandmaintainablemanner.
Futurework includesmodelingof othermajorcomponentsof theSVA suchastheZoneControl
Computers,theCentralComputer,communicationlinks andasimilardetailedanalysisof theZCA,
followedby acomparativelife cyclecostanalysisof thetwo alternativearchitectures.
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APPENDIX I: DEFINITIONS
Mission: A mission is defined as a trip from one station to another, including departures and arrivals at
stations.
Safet2_: A mission completes safely when one of two conditions is met: either (1) the mission completes
successfully, i.e. the vehicle arrives at its destination without incident, or (2) the mission is not completed
successfully but no one onboard is injured, i.e. when the vehicle stops safely at some intermediate point
along the guideway.
Fail-Safe: The ability to bring the vehicle to a safe stop under all possible failure conditions is denoted as
the fail-safe feature of the system.
Reliability: The probability that a trip completes successfully is defined as the reliability of the system. The
reliability requirement is not as stringent as the safety requirement because of the existence of the fail-safe
mode of operation.
Availability: The availability of the system is defined as the probability that a given vehicle is ready to
depart for a mission on time, i.e., it has the minimum dispatch complement (MDC) operational.
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